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In the early hours of 30 August 2013, the United Kingdom House of Commons voted by a 
narrow majority of 285 to 272 against the Government’s motion providing, inter alia, that the 
House: ‘Notes that the use of chemical weapons is a war crime under customary law and a 
crime against humanity, and that the principle of humanitarian intervention provides a sound 
legal basis for taking action’.1 The Prime Minister responded as follows:  
‘Let me say that the House has not voted for either motion tonight. I strongly believe in the need for a tough 
response to the use of chemical weapons, but I also believe in respecting the will of this House of 
Commons. It is very clear tonight that, while the House has not passed a motion, the British Parliament, 
reflecting the views of the British people, does not want to see British military action. I get that, and the 
Government will act accordingly.’2 
 
The British Government subsequently announced that the United Kingdom would not 
participate in a mooted military operation with NATO allies (principally France and the 
United States of America) against Syria in response to an alleged use of chemical weapons in 
the Ghouta district of Damascus on 21 August 2013. The operation was subsequently 
abandoned following an agreement struck by the governments of the United States of 
America, the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic on 26 September in which the 
last undertook to accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention 1993 and devised a 
programme to disarm its declared stockpile of chemical weapons.3  
 Against this background, this article assesses the lawfulness of humanitarian 
intervention after the Syria chemical weapons precedent.4 Whereas some commentators have 
                                                          
1 HC Deb, col 1426 (29 Aug. 2013). 
2 Ibid, col 1556.  
3 See further UNSC Resn 2118 (2013).  
4 For background, see, e.g. – T Franck and N Rodley, ‘After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention 
by Military Force’, (1973) 67 AJIL 275; S Murphy, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations in an 
Evolving World Order (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996); C Greenwood, ‘Humanitarian 
Intervention: The Case of Kosovo’ (1999) 10 Fin Yb of IL 141; S Wheatley, ‘The Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee Report on Kosovo: NATO Action and Humanitarian Intervention’ (2000) 5(1) JCSL 261; S 
Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2001); 
E Decaux, ‘La primarité des droits de l'homme: licéité ou illicéité de l'intervention humainitaire’ and J Flauss, 
‘La primarité des droits de la personne: licéité ou illicéité de l'intervention humainitaire’ in C Tomuschat (ed.), 
Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment (The Hague: Kluwer, 2002), pp 65-102; J 
Holzgrefe and R Keohane (eds), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2003), pp 175-272; S Breau, Humanitarian Intervention: The United Nations and Collective 
Responsibility (London: Cameron May, 2006); G Evans, ‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility 
to Protect’, (2006) 24 Wisconsin International Law Journal 703; C Gray, International Law and the Use of 
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asserted that humanitarian intervention is lawful, probably unlawful or unlawful-yet-
legitimate, 5  it argues that the Syria crisis conclusively demonstrates that humanitarian 
intervention is unlawful.6 In addition, the article examines a key issue that has yet to be 
addressed in the literature: the role of consultative parliamentary votes in the UK, the USA 
and France (‘the P3’) as a constitutional safeguard against aggression.7  These issues are 
analysed with reference to subsequent developments concerning the emergence of Islamic 
State (‘IS’) and ongoing military operations by the USA and its allies in Syria and Iraq.8  
 Humanitarian intervention is defined as the ‘use of force to protect people in another 
State from gross and systematic human rights violations committed against them, or more 
generally to avert a humanitarian catastrophe, when the target State is unwilling or unable to 
act.’ 9  It entails the right of States to use force, individually or collectively, without 
authorisation by the Security Council or the General Assembly. Substantive criteria that have 
been proposed for its application include: 
‘a) the existence of a humanitarian ‘emergency’ or ‘disaster’ or ‘crisis’ or ‘catastrophe’ or ‘necessity’ 
or ‘tragedy’, usually related to the widespread and gross or egregious violation of human rights of (a 
part of) the population of a State or to the commission of grave international crimes;  
b) The inability or unwillingness of the territorial State to act to address the situation;  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Force (Cambridge: CUP, 2008), pp 33-55; M Shaw, International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008), pp 1155-1158; S 
Zifcak, ‘The Responsibility to Protect’ in M Evans (ed.), International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), pp 504-527; J 
Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2012), pp 752-757.  
5 E.g. – H Koh, ‘Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part II: International Law and the Way 
Forward’)’, EJIL Talk! Blog (4 October 2013), available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/syria-and-the-law-of-
humanitarian-intervention-part-ii-international-law-and-the-way-forward/ (accessed: 13 February 2015); D 
Bethlehem, ‘Stepping Back a Moment: The Legal Basis in Favour of a Principle of Humanitarian Intervention’, 
EJIL Talk! Blog (12 September  2013), available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/stepping-back-a-moment-the-legal-
basis-in-favour-of-a-principle-of-humanitarian-intervention/ (accessed: 13 February 2015).      
6 A Henriksen and M Schack, ‘The Crisis in Syria and Humanitarian Intervention’, (2014) 1(1) Journal on the 
Use of Force and IL 122-147 at 147. See also C Stahn, ‘Between Law-breaking and Law-making: Syria, 
Humanitarian Intervention and ‘What the Law Ought to Be’ (2014) 19(1) JCSL 25-48; C Henderson, ‘The UK 
Government’s Legal Opinion on Forcible Measures in Response to the Use of Chemical Weapons by the Syrian 
Government’ (2015) 64 ICLQ (forthcoming). 
7 For background, see, e.g. – J Klabbers, ‘Intervention, Armed Intervention, Armed Attack, Threat to Peace, Act 
of Aggression, and Threat or Use of Force – What's the Difference?’ in Weller and Solomou, above n Error! 
Bookmark not defined., pp 488-506; S Murphy, ‘The Crime of Aggression at the International Criminal Court’ 
in Weller and Solomou, above n Error! Bookmark not defined., pp 533-560. 
8 For background, see, e.g. – C Henderson, ‘The Use of Force and Islamic State’(2014) 1(2) Journal on the Use 
of Force and International Law 209-222.  
9  V Lowe and A Tzanakopoulos, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public 
International Law (2011), para. 3.  
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c) The exhaustion of all other realistically possible remedies, including all peaceful remedies and 
recourse to the UN Security Council (and arguably also the UN General Assembly under the ‘Uniting 
for Peace’ procedure), which are unwilling or unable to act;  
d) the acceptance of limitations (both in scope and in time) upon the use of force (as the necessary and 
sole available course of action), confining it to strictly humanitarian objectives that must be expected to 
do more harm than good, respecting the principle of proportionality.  
To these, some add a preference towards multilateral (rather than unilateral, and as second best to 
collective) action, as well as towards the (relative) disinterestedness of the intervening States and/or 
organizations.’10 
 
Although the application of substantive criteria is a pertinent issue,11 this article focuses upon 
the test of legality as assessed against the support of States for the doctrine. The continuing 
support of the UK (and Denmark) for humanitarian intervention, coupled with the fact that 
the UK remains one of the most militarily-active States in the world, renders an evaluation of 
the legality of humanitarian intervention a critical issue for future use of force scenarios. 
 This article first sets out the historical background of humanitarian intervention in 
order to establish the state of the doctrine prior to the Syria crisis in 2013. Next, it examines 
the legal positions articulated by States with respect to the abortive Syria operation. Finally, it 
compares the role of consultative parliamentary votes in the P3 with respect to Syria in 2013 
and Islamic State in 2014-2015 as a constitutional check upon executive authority to use 
force unlawfully. As the main proponent of humanitarian intervention, the article focuses 
upon this intersection of law and policy in the UK. The article calls upon the British 
Government to discontinue its support for humanitarian intervention, which the Syria episode 
has shown to be clearly unlawful. This change of policy should be enacted through a detailed 
legal framework for the use of force at the forthcoming National Security Strategy review in 
2015. A statutory obligation to consult the House of Commons and independent legal advice 
are critical to provide a robust check on illegal wars, especially in light of the prospective 
entry into force of the International Criminal Court crime of aggression in 2017.  
 
                                                          
10 Id, at para 39. 
11 Greenwood, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, above n 4, pp 157-158.   
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I. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 
The starting-point is the general prohibition on the use of force in international relations12 and 
corresponding duty to resolve international disputes through peaceful means.13 This ban is 
subject to two express exceptions: 1) forcible measures entailing the application or 
authorisation of force by the UN Security Council;14 and 2) individual or collective self-
defence. 15  The Security Council has ‘primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security’, for which purpose the Member States ‘agree that in 
carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.’16  
Whilst the Security Council is the primary actor in international peace and security, it 
is not the exclusive actor: the General Assembly has claimed the power to act in relation to 
international peace and security where, due to a veto in the Security Council, the Security 
Council is incapable of doing so.17 This power has been invoked on ten occasions, most 
recently in relation to the occupied Palestinian territories in 2003. Its lawfulness is widely 
accepted by States18 and has been affirmed by the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’).19 For 
reasons considered below, it is nevertheless rarely employed in practice.  
                                                          
12 Charter of the United Nations, (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI 
(‘Charter’), Art 2(4). See further: Corfu Channel Case (United Kingdom v. Albania)(Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, 
34; Military and Paramilitary Activities in and around Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America)(Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, para 202. See further B Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United 
Nations: A Commentary (Oxford: OUP, 2012). 
13 Charter, Arts 2(3), 33(1).  
14 Charter, Art 42. 
15 Charter, Art 51. 
16 Charter, Art 24(2).  
17 UNGA Res. 377A (‘Uniting for Peace’, Nov. 3 1950).  For background, see A Carswell, ‘Unblocking the UN 
Security Council: The Uniting for Peace Resolution’, (2013) 18(3) JCSL 453-480; J Krasno and M Das, ‘The 
Uniting for Peace Resolution and Other Ways of Circumventing the Authority of the Security Council’ in B 
Cronin and I Hurd (eds), The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority (Routledge, 2008), 
pp 173-195. 
18  J Sloan and G Hernández, ‘The Role of the International Court of Justice in the Development of the 
Institutional Role of the UN’ in C Tams and J Sloan (eds), The Development of International Law by the 
International Court of Justice (Oxford: OUP, 2013), 197-236 at 216. See also C Binder, ‘Uniting for Peace 
Resolution (1950)’, The Max Planck Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (August 2006), para 23.  
19 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) 
[2004] ICJ Rep 136 at paras 26-32. 
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An important question is whether, in the absence of amendment of the Charter to 
provide for a third exception to the comprehensive prohibition on the use of force, 
humanitarian intervention can only become law through customary international law.  To 
adopt humanitarian intervention as custom, it must have gained general acceptance prior to 
the occasion in which it is invoked.20 It must have become a ‘settled practice’ over time with 
reference to the well-known criteria of State practice and opinio iuris.21  This faces the 
problem of ‘hierarchy of norms’, whereby the putative customary norm is displaced or 
trumped by a superior legal norm.  
Accordingly, even if humanitarian intervention were to qualify a norm of customary 
international law, it is contended that the comprehensive prohibition on the use of force in 
Article 2(4) of the Charter remains a superior norm.22 This prioritisation of norms has three 
potential bases in general international law: 1) the lex specialis rule that prioritises more 
specific rules over more general rules – in this case, treaty provisions over customary 
norms;23 2) the effect of Article 103 of the Charter as a supremacy clause, prioritising Charter 
provisions over other norms of international law;24 or 3) the status of the prohibition on the 
use of force as a ius cogens (peremptory or non-derogable) norm.25 The application of these 
rules depends upon legal context, such as the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal applying 
                                                          
20 In inverse, see the ‘International Law Commission Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts’ Yearbook of the International Law Commission (2001) Vol. II, Part 2, Art 13.   
21 For background, see Wood, ‘First Report on Custom’, above n 7 at 12-17. 
22  The comprehensive prohibition on the use of force should be read together with the prohibition on 
interference in the internal or external affairs of a State, implicit in Article 2(4), and the Article 2(3) duty to 
resolve international disputes peacefully. The use of force to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe in an internal 
armed conflict would, absent the consent of the government, breach these duties – see, e.g. – Military and 
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), (1986) ICJ Rep 14 at 
88-104 (paras 187-195). See further, e.g. – Klabbers, above n 9.   
23 For background, see the analysis and scholarship cited in Koskenniemi, ‘Report of the Study Group of the 
International Law Commission on Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ (‘ILC Fragmentation Report’) at 39-40 (paras 66-67), p 45 
(para 79). 
24 Ibid at 168-181 (paras 328-360). 
25 Ibid at 188-189 (para 374).  
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them26 and UN membership of the parties. Concordantly, the only avenue to add a third 
exception to the Article 2(4) prohibition is the Article 108 amendment procedure requiring 
adoption and ratification by a two-thirds majority of the General Assembly, including the 
Permanent Members of the Security Council.  
Proponents of humanitarian intervention have contended that it is possible to ‘flexibly 
interpret’ Article 2(4) through customary law. For example, Greenwood wrote in relation to 
the use of force against Serbia: 
‘It has been argued that, because the United Nations Charter contains a prohibition of the use of force 
and no express exception for humanitarian intervention, there can be no question of international law 
recognising a right of humanitarian intervention. That is, however, to take too rigid a view of 
international law…While nobody would suggest that intervention is justified whenever a State violates 
human rights, international law does not require that respect for the sovereignty and integrity of a State 
must in all cases be given priority over the protection of human rights and human life, no matter how 
serious the violations of those rights perpetrated by that State. 
 
Moreover, international law is not confined to treaty texts. It includes customary international law. That 
law is not static but develops through a process of State practice, of actions and the reaction to those 
actions. Since 1945, that process has seen a growing importance attached to the preservation of human 
rights. Where the threat to human rights has been of an extreme character, States have been prepared to 
assert a right of humanitarian intervention as a matter of last resort.’27 
 
This argument is unconvincing due to the fact that the change would be the accretion of a 
third exception rather than the interpretation of existing exceptions. However, even if this 
interpretive method is orthodox, the evidentiary threshold for the identification of 
humanitarian intervention as a norm of customary international law would be a high one: 
clear evidence would be required of an intention by States to add a third exception and 
thereby weaken the comprehensive ban on the use of force. A compelling scenario may be a 
proposal to amend the Charter adopted by the required two-thirds majority of the General 
Assembly and defeated by the deployment of a veto.  
                                                          
26 Ibid at 46 (para 82), 229 (para 452).  
27 E.g. – C Greenwood, ‘International law and the NATO intervention in Kosovo’, (2000) 49(4) ICLQ 926-934 
at 929. 
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Although the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has a long history in international 
law scholarship,28 it was only in the 1990s that States began to consider it as an alternative to 
the two Charter bases for the use of force.29 Proponents of the doctrine30 and a few States 
(e.g. – Belgium 31 ) had argued in relation to Kosovo that uses of force in Bangladesh, 
Kampuchea, Afghanistan, the Central African Empire, Liberia and particularly the ‘no fly 
zones’ in northern Iraq evidenced such State support. As Gray opines: ‘A certain amount of 
revisionism in the interpretation of past practice has proved attractive to some [S]tates.’32 
Nevertheless, as Rodley concludes: 
‘The condemnations by the UN General Assembly of the interventions in Bangladesh, Kampuchea, and 
Afghanistan are sufficient to deny these interventions the status of evidence of state practice qualifying 
as custom. The Ugandan intervention, justified by Tanzania on ground of self-defence and, still 
condemned by the OAU, at best could be offered as an example of the mitigating circumstances 
principle at work. The same conclusion is the better explanation of the non-condemnation of France’s 
intervention, again not justified on the basis of a doctrine of humanitarian intervention.’33 
 
Thus, in evaluating State practice, two factors are particularly important to evince opinio 
iuris: 1) the subjective invocation of the State that is action is motivated by a belief of 
lawfulness at the time; and 2) the expressions of support by other States for that conduct on 
legal grounds. Originally, British policy was sceptical on humanitarian intervention: 
‘In fact, the best case that can be made in support of humanitarian intervention is that it cannot be said 
to be unambiguously illegal...the overwhelming majority of contemporary legal opinion comes down 
against the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention for three reasons: first, the UN Charter and 
the corpus of modern international law do not seem specifically to incorporate such a right; secondly, 
state practice in the past two centuries, and especially since 1945, at best provides only a handful of 
genuine cases of humanitarian intervention, and, on most assessments, none at all; and finally, on 
prudential grounds, that the scope of abusing such a rights argues strongly against its creation.’34 
 
                                                          
28 I Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (Oxford: OUP, 1963), pp 338-347. See further 
E.C. Stowell, Intervention in International Law (Washington, D.C.: J. Bryne & Co, 1921), pp 51-62; Franck and 
Rodley, above n 4. 
29 Gray, above n 4, pp 35-37. See also Henrickson and Schack, above n 5 at 134-137. 
30 E.g. – Greenwood, above n 27 at 929-930 
31 Gray, above n 4, p 49. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Rodley, above n Error! Bookmark not defined., p 784.  
34 ‘British Foreign Office (Foreign Policy Document No.148)’, (1986) 57 BYIL 614 at 619. 
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From August 1992 the UK adopted the position that, in the event of a veto in the Security 
Council, individual States may unilaterally use force (subject to specific criteria35) to alleviate 
a compelling and urgent situation of extreme humanitarian distress demanding immediate 
relief. Whilst the UK invoked the doctrine in the mid-1990s for Operation Safe Haven 
following the Persian Gulf War, the USA relied upon implied authorisation by the Security 
Council.36  Yet, when confrontations with Iraqi warplanes occurred during the operation, 
‘[t]he preference of the UK and the USA not to enter into discussion of the legal basis of the 
no-fly zones, but to focus where possible on claims to self-defence, indicates at least an 
awareness that the doctrine of humanitarian intervention remained controversial.’37   
The aerial bombardment undertaken by NATO members in Kosovo in 1999 was the 
key test case for the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention.38 Amongst NATO Members, 
only the UK and Belgium invoked the doctrine to justify their uses of force.39 Not only did 
other NATO members not invoke it in the Legality on the Use of Force cases40 before the ICJ 
but some (e.g. – Germany and the USA) even stated that the operation was not to be seen as a 
precedent for future action.41 Russia, China and the Non-Aligned Movement (‘NAM’) were 
strongly opposed to the concept of humanitarian intervention without Security Council 
authorisation.42 In 2000, the G77 declared: ‘We reject the so-called “right” of humanitarian 
intervention, which has no legal basis in the United Nations Charter or in the general 
                                                          
35 See further V Lowe, ‘International Legal Issues Arising in the Kosovo Case’ (2000) 49(4) ICLQ 934 at 939-
942.  
36 Gray, above n 4, p 37.  
37 Ibid, p 38.  
38 Henrickson and Schack, above n 9 at 137. 
39  Gray, above n 4, pp 42, 45.  
40 E.g. – Legality of Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom), Preliminary Objections, [2004] 
ICJ Rep. 1307. 
41 Gray, above n 4, p 47.  
42 Ibid, p 52.  
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principles of international law.’43  The Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
commissioned by Sweden concluded that ‘the intervention was legitimate, but not legal’.44 
The British Government had asserted that the ‘humanitarian intervention as an 
exceptional measure on grounds of overwhelming humanitarian necessity, military 
intervention is legally justifiable.’45 However, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee concluded: i) at the very least, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has a 
tenuous basis in current international customary law, and that this renders the NATO action 
legally questionable; and ii) NATO's military action, if of dubious legality in the current state 
of international law, was justified on moral grounds.46 These conclusions were reached with 
the benefit of evidence submitted by distinguished international lawyers.47 
In the 2000s, the Canadian-inspired ‘responsibility to protect’ concept 48  placed a 
renewed emphasis upon the central role of the UN collective security system for the 
protection of civilians in armed conflict.49 States declared at 2005 World Summit: 
‘Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity…In this context, we are prepared to take collective 
                                                          
43 ‘Group of 77 South Summit, Havana, Cuba, 10-17 April 2000, Declaration of the South Summit’, para. 54, 
available at: http://www.g77.org/summit/Declaration_G77Summit.htm (accessed 13 February 2015).  
44 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, 
Lessons Learned (2000), p 289.  
45 House of Commons Defence Committee, Intervention: Why, When and How?: Government Response, (HC 
2013-14, 952) at 14. 
46 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee Fourth Report, HC 781 (23 May 2000), pp 132, 138. 
47 Lowe, above n 34 at 938; Greenwood, above n 27 at 934; I Brownlie and C Apperley, ‘Kosovo crisis inquiry: 
memorandum on the international law aspects’, (2000) 49(4) ICLQ 878-905 at 904-905; C Chinkin, ‘The 
legality of NATO’s action in the former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) under international law’, (2000) 49(4) 
ICLQ 910-925 at 924. See further Wheatley, n 4 above. 
48 For background, see, e.g. – M Vashakmadze, ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in B Simma et al, above n 12 (Vol 
II), 1207-1236, pp 1225, 1230; L Glanville, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders’, (2012) HRLR  
available at: http://hrlr.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/01/23/hrlr.ngr047.full.pdf+html (accessed 13 
February 2015); C Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’, 101(1) AJIL 
(2007) 99; S Mohamed, ‘Restructuring the Debate on Unauthorized Humanitarian Intervention’, (2011) 88(4) 
North Car Law Rev 1275; M Matthews, ‘Tracking the Emergence of a New International Norm – The 
Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur’ (2008) 31(1) Bos Col Int and Comp Law Rev 137; G Evans, 
‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’ (2006-2007) 24 Wisc Inter Law Jour 703.  
49 C Powell, ‘Libya: A Multilateral Constitutional Moment?’ 106 AJIL (2012) 298; M Schmitt, ‘Legitimacy 
Versus Legality Redux: Arming the Syrian Rebels’ 7 Jour of Nat Sec Law and Pol (2014) 139; M Sterio, 
‘Humanitarian Intervention Post-Syria: Legitimate and Legal?’ (15 January 2014) Cleveland-Marshall Legal 
Studies Paper No. 14-262, SSRN Paper, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2379656; D 
Berman and C Michaelsen, ‘Intervention in Libya: Another Nail in the Coffin for the Responsibility-to-Protect?’ 
14(4) Inter Com Law Rev (2012) 337.  
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action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, 
including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations 
as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.’50 
 
It has been argued that, as the two concepts are fundamentally distinct, the adoption of the 
responsibility to protect did not negate humanitarian intervention.51  
Over the past six years, the Security Council has been the principal forum for 
collective security action – most notably in the case of Libya (2011).52 The prospect of a 
massacre of rebellious citizens in Benghazi by the Libyan government persuaded a 10-0-5 
majority of the Security Council, citing the responsibility to protect, to authorise Member 
States to take ‘all necessary measures to protect civilians and civilian population areas under 
threat or attack.’53 The controversial implementation of the resolution prompted suspicion 
amongst certain States concerning the possibility of abuse, leading to Security Council 
paralysis during the first two years of Syrian civil war.54 
Until the Syria case, there was no attempt after Kosovo to invoke the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention to justify a unilateral use of force. Commentators were divided on 
the question of legality at the time of the Syria crisis.55 Some believed that the use of force 
would be unlawful56 but arguably legitimate,57 citing the hierarchy of norms and/or a lack of 
                                                          
50 UNGA Res. 60/1 (‘2005 World Summit Outcome’)(24 October 2005), paras 138-139. This was affirmed in 
UNSC Res. 1674 (28 April 2006), OP4. 
51 E.g. – Stahn, above n 48 at 120.  
52 Vashakmadze, above n 48 at 1216-1218.  
53 UNSC Res. 1973 (2011), Preamble, OP 4, 6. The responsibility to protect was also cited by the Security 
Council in adopting targeted sanctions regarding Côte d’Ivoire – UNSC Res. 1975 (2011), Preamble. 
54 Gareth Evans, ‘After Syria: The Future of the Responsibility to Protect’, Global Leadership Foundation (12 
March 2014), available at: http://www.g-l-
f.org/index.cfm?id=62090&modex=blogid&modexval=17032&blogid=17032 (accessed 13 February 2015). See 
also O Courten and V Koutroulis, ‘The Illegality of Military Support to Rebels in the Libyan War: Aspects of 
Ius contra bellum and ius in bello’ (2013) 18(1) JCSL 59. 
55  ‘Debate Map: Use of Force against Syria’, Oxford Public International Law,  available at: 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/page/debate_map_syria/debate-map-use-of-force-against-syria (accessed: 13 February 
2015).   
56 E.g. – C Lynch and K DeYoung, ‘U.S. explores possible legal justifications for a strike on Syria’, The 
Washington Post (10 September 2013)(David Kaye), available at: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-explores-possible-legal-justifications-for-strike-on-
syria/2013/08/28/0d9c6c08-0fe3-11e3-bdf6-e4fc677d94a1_story.html (accessed: 13 February 2015); E Posner, 
‘The U.S. Has No Legal Basis to Intervene in Syria’ (28 August 2013), available at: 
 
 11 
 
supporting practice. 58  Others opined that sufficient practice existed to conclude that 
humanitarian intervention had customary status and that Article 2(4) can be interpreted 
flexibly to allow for the addition of a third exception.59 
It is averred that the use of force against Syria would have been unlawful, which by 
extension renders the threat of force unlawful.60 The orthodox interpretation of Article 103 as 
applicable not only to treaty obligations but also to customary rights would preclude custom 
from modifying the Charter regime on the use of force without recourse to the Article 108 
amendment procedure. Koh’s assertion ‘in the name of fidelity to the U.N. and this rigid 
conception of international law, leaders would either have to accept civilian slaughter or 
break the law’61  overlooks the fact that there exist two legal mechanisms for collective 
enforcement action: 1) Security Council action or authorisation; and 2) in the event of a veto, 
General Assembly authorisation under the Uniting for Peace procedure (most recently 
employed in 2003 in relation to Palestine62)  subject to the caveats discussed below.  
Furthermore, even if custom can in principle be used as an interpretive gloss upon 
Article 2(4), it is argued that humanitarian intervention had failed to gain sufficient support 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2013/08/the_u_s_has_no_legal_basis_for
_its_action_in_syria_but_that_won_t_stop_us.html (accessed: 13 February 2015).  
57 E.g. – E Perez, ‘Obama looks to Congress to bolster legal case for Syria strike’, CNN (3 September 2013)(R 
Chesney), available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/02/us/obama-syria-legal-issues/ (accessed: 13 February 
2015). 
58 E.g. – D Akande, ‘The Legality of Military Action in Syria: Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility 
to Protect’, EJIL: Talk! Blog (28 August 2013), available at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/humanitarian-intervention-
responsibility-to-protect-and-the-legality-of-military-action-in-syria/ (accessed: 13 February 2015); 
‘Viewpoints: Is there legal basis for intervention in Syria?’ (R McCuorquodale), BBC News (29 August 2013), 
available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-23847169 (accessed: 13 February 2015); P Campos, ‘Striking 
Syria is Completely Illegal’, Time (5 September 2013), available at: http://ideas.time.com/2013/09/05/obamas-
plan-for-intervention-in-syria-is-illegal/ (accessed: 13 February 2015).  
59 See Koh and Bethlehem, above n 5.  
60 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), 
[1986] ICJ Rep. 14, 107-108 (para. 205). 
61 Koh, above n 5. 
62 Binder, above n 18. 
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from States by the time of the Syrian crisis.63  On this point, Sir Daniel Bethlehem QC 
asserted at the time of the crisis: 
‘Although only few of the other NATO States that participated in the Kosovo military action in 1999 
came out publicly to explain the legal basis of their action, there can be little doubt that most, if not all, 
considered that action to be lawful. And, absent any other legal basis for that action, it is evident that 
the legal basis relied upon by NATO and its participating States – even if not expressed publicly – was 
that of humanitarian intervention. The Kosovo precedent is therefore a much wider and more robust 
precedent than is often acknowledged.’64 
 
Sir Daniel offered no substantiation for the proposition that NATO Member States privately 
invoked humanitarian intervention (even if a privately-expressedprivate view can constitute 
opinio iuris65). Professor Harold Koh, a former Legal Adviser to the US Department of State, 
concurred with Sir Daniel’s analysis: drawing an analogy with the customary right of self-
defence,66 he argued that Article 2(4) permits a customary norm of humanitarian intervention 
in order to realise the Purposes of the UN. Citing a 1999 paper by Professor Adam Roberts,67 
he averred: ‘Seventeen other NATO members individually satisfied themselves of the legality 
of their participation in the operation.’  
However, both Bethlehem and Koh overlooked the fact (acknowledged in the Roberts 
paper 68 ) that the NATO governments ‘generally eschewed the opportunity’ to invoke 
humanitarian intervention in the aforementioned Legality on the Use of Force proceedings. 
Neither Bethlehem nor Koh acknowledged the considerable opposition to humanitarian 
intervention expressed by non-NATO States; 69  focusing onFocusing upon the public 
pronouncements of the US and UK governments, Koh criticised the omission of the Obama 
Administration to ‘issue its detailed legal opinion elaborating [the White House Counsel’s] 
view’ and yet seemingly assumed that the Administration was tacitly relying on humanitarian 
                                                          
63 See further Henricksen and Schack, above n 6; Akande, above n 58.  
64 Bethlehem, above n 59.  
65 Wood, ‘Second Report on Identification of Customary International Law’, International Law Commission, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/672 (22 May 2014), 53-63 (paras 75-80). 
66 A Randelzhofer and G Nolte, ‘Article 51’ in Simma et al, above n 12 (Vol II), 1397-1428, pp 1401-1406. 
67 Roberts, ‘NATO’s “Humanitarian War” over Kosovo’, (1999) 41(3) Survival 102-123. 
68 Ibid, at 107. 
69 See, e.g. – Akande, above n 58. 
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intervention.70 His critique of ‘per se illegality’ and his assertion that ‘President Obama did 
not violate international law by threatening to use force in Syria in the face of a persistent 
Russian veto’ primarily sought to cast doubt upon the existence of definitive law; he did not 
posit evidence to sustain the existence of a customary norm. He concluded: 
‘Syria is a lawmaking moment. It should be treated that way. International lawyers in and out of 
government need to discuss and define a narrow “affirmative defense” to Article 2(4) that would clarify 
the contours of an emerging lawful exception to a rigid rule. The Clinton Administration’s failure to 
articulate a clear legal rationale for its Kosovo intervention haunts us now.  Continuing to threaten 
military action in Syria without stating a public legal rationale creates a dangerous precedent.  In the 
future, other less-humanitarian minded states can cite Obama’s threat and put their own broad spin on 
the legal interpretation, to use the murky concepts of humanitarian intervention and R2P for their own 
self-interested purposes.’ 
 
This statement suggests that Koh is conscious of the fact that traditional methods of 
identifying customary international law through reference to State practice and opinio iuris 
undermine his apology of the US threat of force. Despite his criticism of traditional methods 
and of the notion of per se illegality, he inconsistently emphasises publicly-expressed legal 
positions by governments for legislation.  
Therefore, even if Koh’s argument that humanitarian intervention is not per se a 
breach of the comprehensive ban on the use of force is correct, the absence of publicly-
articulated legal positions by States that humanitarian intervention is lawful defeats his 
ultimate argument of legality. Concurring with the report of the House of Commons Foreign 
Affairs Select Committee, it is consequently argued that the uses of force by NATO members 
against Serbia were unlawful. Moreover, the hostile reactions of States to the doctrine 
confirms that, following the Kosovo operation, it had not gained sufficient support to 
crystallize into a norm of customary international law71 by 30 August 2013.  
                                                          
70 For another view, see J Goldsmith, ‘Dehn on Syria and Humanitarian Intervention’, Lawfare (6 September 
2013), available at: http://www.lawfareblog.com/dehn-syria-and-humanitarian-intervention [Accessed: 2 July 
2015].  
71 R Zacklin, The United Nations Secretariat and the Use of Force in a Unipolar World: Power v. Principle 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2010), p 144.  
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An additional problem is the divergence of substantive tests for humanitarian 
intervention put forward by various apologists for humanitarian intervention. The UK 
Government position is that three criteria must be met for humanitarian intervention to apply:  
1) there is convincing evidence, generally accepted by the international community as 
a whole, of extreme humanitarian distress on a large scale, requiring immediate and 
urgent relief;  
2) it must be objectively clear that there is no practicable alternative to the use of 
force if lives are to be saved; and  
3) the proposed use of force must be necessary and proportionate to the aim of relief 
of humanitarian need and must be strictly limited in time and scope to this aim (i.e. 
the minimum necessary to achieve that end and for no other purpose).72 
However, other criteria that have been proposed include the inability or unwillingness of the 
territorial State to act to address the situation, the exhaustion of all other realistically possible 
remedies (i.e. – the UNSCUN), multilateral action only (i.e. – no unilateral action) and 
‘disinterestedness’ by the intervening States and/or organisations.73 In addition, there is no 
consensus on the triggering event of a ‘humanitarian distress/emergency/catastrophe’.74 Even 
if there were sufficient State practice supporting the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention, 
this considerable confusion concerning its substantive criteria undermines the existence of 
opinio iuris creating a settled practice for customary law. 
It should also be emphasised that the rationale for a right of States to use force to 
prevent a humanitarian catastrophe overlooks the existence of the aforementioned Uniting for 
Peace procedure. The impression that the veto power in the Security Council can utterly 
                                                          
72 Below n 138. 
73 E.g. – Tzanakopoulos and Lowe, above n 10.  
74 GrayE.g. – Stahn, above n 4, pp 50-51.6.  
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frustrate collective security75 – creating a dilemma of either permitting the humanitarian 
catastrophe to occur or breaching the law in order to prevent it – is false. The prospective 
entry into force of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) concerning the 
crime of aggression, considered below, reinforces the attractiveness of General Assembly 
authorisation for forcible measures over that of an unlawful, unilateral use of force. 
However, an important caveat is that the Uniting for Peace procedure, as currently 
formulated, only provides for recommendation of ‘the use of armed force’ in cases of breach 
of the peace or an act of aggression.76 The rationale of averting a humanitarian catastrophe, 
entailing serious breaches of human rights or international crimes within a State (as opposed 
to an inter-State armed conflict), constitutes a ‘threat to the peace’ but not a ‘breach of the 
peace’ or an ‘act of aggression’.77 Although Uniting for Peace does not consequently cover 
the Kosovo or Syria scenarios, Carswell asserts: 
‘[F]rom a strictly legal perspective, it is logically absurd to suggest that the Council’s failure to 
exercise its primary responsibility following a threat to the peace should dictate any diminishment of 
the Assembly’s power to address that omission. On the other hand, the Uniting for Peace resolution 
reflects a political compromise, and it is politics, not law, that imposed such a limitation. In any event, 
there is no legal obstacle to extending the Assembly’s power to recommend force to include threats to 
the peace.’78 
 
Carswell concludes that Uniting for Peace is unconstitutional in its present form and proposes 
that it be construed to acknowledge the primacy of the Security Council and the validity of 
the veto power in order to revitalise the General Assembly’s secondary role in international 
peace and security as a means to encourage the Security Council to fulfil its primary role.79  
Concurring with this assessment, the extension of Uniting for Peace to allow for 
authorisation of forcible measures to address threats to the peace would be a useful reform to 
                                                          
75 See, e.g. – Webb, ‘Deadlock or Restraint? The Security Council Veto and the Use of Force in Syria’, 19(3) 
Journal of Conflict and Security Law (2014), 471-488. 
76 Zacklin, above n 71. 
77 N Krisch, ‘Article 39’ in Simma et al, above n 12 (Vol II), 1272-1296, pp 1285-1287; Carswell, above n 17, at 
475.  
78 Carswell, above n 17, at 476.  
79 Ibid, at 456, 479. 
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‘internalise’ the handling of situations akin to Syria within the UN system. There would be no 
need to resort to unorthodox legal argumentation techniques in order, as advocated by Koh, to 
‘stretch’ the settled meaning of Article 2(4) to provide for a unilateral right to use force, 
legislated through custom rather than Charter amendment. Rather, States seeking to use force 
to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe would have a clear path towards legality: authorisation 
by the Security Council authorisation in the first instance, followed by , alternatively General 
Assembly authorisation into circumvent the event of frustration through veto. Of course, the 
implementation of authorised measures is at least as important as their retention – as the 
controversy concerning the Libya case illustrated.         
  
II. THE LEGAL POSITIONS OF STATES REGARDING THE SYRIA OPERATION 
The critical period for States to express their positions concerning the lawfulness of the 
proposed use of force was from the chemical weapons attack in Ghouta on 21 August 2013 
until the disarmament agreement on 21 September during which the use of force was debated 
in national parliaments, in international fora and in the media. The 67th session of the UN 
General Assembly opened on 18 September, by which time discussion had shifted from the 
use of force to diplomacy. Nonetheless, legality was a factor, to varying degrees, in these 
debates. After examining the legal positions of the UK, USA and France (‘the P3’) the 
reaction of the international community is appraised.  
 
A. The Legal Positions of the P3     
The first significant event was the decision by British Government to seek the support of the 
House of Commons through a parliamentary motion. The legal position adopted by the 
Government set out in its summary of 29 August was that the proposed use of force was 
lawful under humanitarian intervention. According to its two-step approach, the Government 
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initially sought the endorsement of the House of Commons of the principle of humanitarian 
intervention; following publication of a then-pending UN report concerning whether 
chemical weapons had been used in Ghouta, it would then seek a second motion supporting 
its proposed application against Syria. As aforementioned, the unexpected rejection of the 
first motion on 30 August, following some ten hours of debate, prompted the Prime Minister 
to abandon this plan.  
Debate was also held in the House of Lords on 29 August before which a motion was 
brought by the Government that that House ‘[take] note of the use of chemical weapons in 
Syria’.80  Frequent reference was made to the legal grounds for the use of force in that 
debate,81  including by a former Attorney General,82  a former head of HM’s Diplomatic 
Service83 and former Leaders of the Conservative Party and of the Liberal Democrats.84 
Following the rejection of the Government’s motion by the House of Commons, the House of 
Lords adjourned its debate.85 
In the USA, the question of legality was peripheral. President Obama did not refer to 
it in his call for ‘authorization for the use of force by the American people’s representatives 
in Congress’86  and Secretary Kerry likewise made no reference to it in his evidence to 
congressional committees.87 However, the media reported that the Department of Justice 
Office of Legal Counsel had provided a legal opinion to President Obama: 
                                                          
80 HL Deb (29 August 2013), ‘Syria and the Use of Chemical Weapons’, col 1719.  
81 Ibid, cols 1767-1768 (Lord Brennan), 1769 (Lord Thomas of Gresford), 1779 (Lord Phillips of Sudbury), 
1780 (Lord Rathsbotham), 1782-1783 (Lord Desai), 1791-1792 (Lord Inglewood), 1800 (Lord Cormack), 1807 
(Baroness Tonge), 1812 (Baroness Uddin), 1816 (Lord Triesman), 1820 (Lord Wallace of Saltaire). 
82 Ibid, col 1739 (Lord Goldsmith). 
83 Ibid, col 1730 (Lord Wright of Richmond). 
84 Ibid, col 1731 (Lord Howard of Lympne), 1734-1735 (Lord Ashdown of Norton-sub-Hampdon).  
85 Ibid, cols 1825-1826.  
86 ‘Statement by the President on Syria’ (31 August 2013), available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/08/31/statement-president-syria (accessed: 13 February 2015).   
87 ‘Opening Remarks before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: John Kerry, Secretary of 
State’ (3 September 2013), available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/212603.htm (accessed: 
13 February 2015); ‘Syria: Weighing the Obama Administration’s Response’ (4 September 2013), available at: 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/09/213787.htm (accessed: 13 February 2015).   
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‘The administration's lawyers have been careful to guide the choice of words used by top officials. 
Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry, who made a forceful case for military action on Friday, have 
carefully portrayed al Assad's actions as violating "international norms.” That's in part because Syria 
isn't among the 188 countries, including the United States that signed the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, the treaty that prohibits the production and use of such weapons.’88 
 
The legal opinion has not been published in the Department of State’s Digest of United States 
Practice in International Law 2013.89  
 On 4 September, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed by ten votes to 
seven the Senate Joint Resolution (‘Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against the 
Government of Syria in Response to Use of Chemical Weapons’), which stated that ‘the 
President has authority under the Constitution to use force in order to defend the national 
security interests of the United States’.90  It was introduced before the full Senate on 6 
September but not brought to a vote. In the Senate debates, neither humanitarian intervention 
nor the responsibility to protect were referenced.91  
In France, legality was a more prominent issue than in the USA but less so than in the 
UK. On 27 August, President Hollande called for an international response, invoking ‘respect 
for international law’ as an indispensable condition for the use of force and as the best 
guarantee for preserving collective security: 
‘Yet, international law must evolve with the times. It cannot be a pretext for permitting the perpetration 
of mass massacres. It is why I recognise the principle of “the responsibility to protect” civilian 
populations as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005.’92 
                                                          
88 Perez, ‘Obama looks to Congress’. The White House Legal Counsel, Kathryn Ruemmler, was also quoted by 
the New York Times as saying that ‘the president believed a strike would be lawful, both in international law and 
domestic law, even if neither the Security Council nor Congress approved it’ – C Savage, ‘Obama Tests Limits 
of Power in Syrian Conflict’ (8 September 2013), available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/09/world/middleeast/obama-tests-limits-of-power-in-syrian-
conflict.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed: 13 February 2015).  
89 Guymon (ed.), Office of the Legal Adviser, US Department of State, Digest of United States Practice in 
International Law 2013, pp 552-554. 
90  Library of Congress, ‘Bill Text 113th Congress (2013-2014) S.J.RES.21.PCS’, available at: 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c113:S.J.RES.21(accessed: 13 February 2015).  
91 Congressional Record, Senate, 159(117), 9 September 2013 (S6273-S6284); 159(118), 10 September 2013 
(S6305-S6306, S6312-S6320); 159(119) 11 September 2013 (S6340-S6348, S6367-S6369); 159(122), 17 
September 2013 (S6482-S6483). Congressional Record, House of Representatives, 159(117), 9 September 2013 
(H5409-H5410); 159(118), 10 September 2013 (H5437-H5438, H5440-H5442); 159(119), 11 September 2013 
(H5480, H5484, H5493); 159(110), 12 September 2013 (H5532).     
92 ‘Allocution du président de la République à l’occasion de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs’ (27 August 
2013), available at: http://www.elysee.fr/declarations/article/allocution-du-president-de-la-republique-a-l-
occasion-de-la-conference-des-ambassadeurs/ (accessed : 13 February 2015)(author’s translation). 
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This reference to the responsibility to protect was the closest that the Hollande 
Administration came to a publicly-expressed legal justification during the crisis.93  
Neither the then-Prime Minister, M. Jean-Marc Ayrault, nor the Foreign Minister, M. 
Laurent Fabius, referred to legality in debates held in the National Assembly and the Senate 
on 4 September 2013.94 The Government reportedly furnished the National Assembly with 
legal advice asserting ‘that, legally, they felt that they could take military action without a 
Security Council resolution.’95 However, no such advice has been published.96  
In the debate, several deputies opposed the operation due to the absence of a UN 
mandate.97 One observed that the possibility existed of seeking authorisation by the General 
Assembly through the Uniting for Peace procedure.98 The responsibility to protect was cited 
by one deputy in opposition to the use of force and in support of humanitarian assistance and 
diplomatic initiatives.99 No resolution was put to a vote due to its specific preclusion by 
Article 35 of the constitution of France.  
 
 
 
                                                          
93 No reference was made to the responsibility to protect when, in an interview with Le Monde on 31 August – 
‘Syrie Interview du Président dans le Monde du 31 août 2013’, available at: 
http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/syrie/la-france-et-la-syrie/actualites-2013/article/syrie-interview-
du-president-dans (accessed: 13 February 2015). M. Fabius likewise did not refer to it in a press conference with 
Secretary Kerry on 7 September – ‘Recontre entre Laurent Fabius et John Kerry (Paris, 7 septembre 2013)’, 
available at: http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/syrie/la-france-et-la-syrie/actualites-
2013/article/rencontre-entre-laurent-fabius-et-108231 (accessed: 13 February 2015). 
94  Assemblée nationale, XIVe législature, deuxième session extraordinare de 2012-2013, compte rendu, 
prèmiere séance du mercredi 04 septembre 2013; Sénat, Journal officiel des débats, compte rendu intégral, 
séance du mercredi 04 septembre 2013, débat sur la situation en Syrie. 
95 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Government foreign policy towards the United States, oral 
evidence (3 December 2013), at Q168 and Q175 (Mike Gapes MP). However, Mr Gapes stated in email 
correspondence with the author that he had ‘got his information from media reports’.  
96 ‘Documents parlementaires’, available at : http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/documents/index.asp (accessed: 
13 February 2015).  
97 Ibid, M. Christian Jacob (Président du groupe Union pour un Movement Populaire), M. Jean-Louis Borloo 
(Union des démocrates et indépendants), M. Paul Giacobbi (Radical, républicain, démocrate et progressiste), M. 
André Chassaigne (Président du groupe Gauche démocrate et républicaine).  
98 Ibid, M. Jean-Louis Borloo (Union des démocrates et indépendants). 
99 Ibid, M. André Chassaigne (Président du groupe Gauche démocrate et républicain). 
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B. The Legal Positions in the International Community 
NATO allies largely refrained from public comment on legality. 100  Whilst the NATO 
Secretary-General called for military action, NATO members did not adopt a common 
position and no proposal was made for a joint operation – reportedly due, at least in part, to 
the absence of a UN mandate.101 The P3 failed to gain an EU Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (‘CFSP’) position supporting the use of force and the then-EU High Representative for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Lady Catherine Ashton made no public comment.102 
At the G20 summit of 5-6 September 2013, the UN Secretary-General averred that 
‘any decision [to act] “should be taken within the framework of the UN Charter, as a matter 
of principle.”’103 The heads of government of Brazil, India, Argentina, China, South Africa, 
and Indonesia joined President Putin to oppose as unlawful any military action without a UN 
mandate. 104  Whilst 11 of the 20 participants (Australia, Canada, France, Italy, Japan, 
Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Turkey, the UK and the USA) signed a joint 
statement circulated by the White House in support of its position, that statement was 
                                                          
100 E.g. – Ralf Neukirch, ‘Military Intervention: Germany Caught in the Middle over Syria’, Der Spiegel Online 
International (2 September 2013), available at: http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/german-government-
takes-delicate-position-on-attack-on-syria-a-919736.html (accessed: 13 February 2015). It has been noted that 
‘the Danish government followed the British approach in its legal justification – Henrisken and Schack, above n 
9, at 127 (note 23). 
101  ‘Monthly press conference by the NATO Secretary-General’, NATO Newsroom (2 September 2013), 
available at: http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_102716.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed: 13 
February 2015). See also ‘NATO chief calls for intervention in Syria’, Deutsche Welle (2 September 2013), 
available at: http://www.dw.de/nato-chief-calls-for-intervention-in-syria/a-17061245 (accessed: 13 February 
2015). 
102 ‘Statement from HR Ashton reflecting the agreed position of the European Union – all 28 member states’ (7 
September 2013), available at: http://www.eu2013.lt/en/news/statements/statement-from-hr-ashton-reflecting-
the-agreed-position-of-the-european-unionall-28-member-states (accessed: 13 February 2015). 
103 ‘At G20 summit, Ban, UN-Arab League Envoy push for political solution to Syria crisis’, UN News Centre 
(24 September 2013), available at: 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45780&Cr=syria&Cr1=g20&Kw1=syria&Kw2=&Kw3=#.Uy
LUiSguPIU (accessed: 13 February 2015). 
104 ‘G20 Syria divide: World’s largest nations speak out against US-led strike’, Russia Today (6 September 
2013), available at: http://rt.com/news/g20-against-syria-strike-527/ (accessed: 13 February 2015).    
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‘carefully crafted to omit the controversial crux of the American plan: punitive airstrikes on 
Syria, to be led by the US, quite possibly without UN backing’.105  
The Arab League called upon the UN to act as several members reportedly opposed a 
military operation without a UN mandate.106 Although the Non-Aligned Movement did not 
make an explicit statement on the aborted use of force in Syria,107 at its last summit in August 
2012 it reaffirmed its opposition to ‘toutes actions militaires unilatérales, ou usage ou menace 
d’usage de la force contre la souveraineté, l’intégrité territorial et l’indépendance des pays 
non alignés, lesquelles constituent des actes d’agression et des violations flagrantes des 
principes de la Charte des Nations Unies, dont celui de la non-ingérence dans les affaires 
intérieures des États’.108 In the General Assembly, a number of delegations chose to criticise 
the proposed operation in both direct and oblique terms;109 some cited the responsibility to 
protect, emphasising the central role of the UN for the use of force.110  
On 5 December 2013, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 68/38 (2013) by a 
vote of 127-5-52 (USA, UK, Israel, Micronesia and Palau against) in which it, inter alia: 
‘Requests the States parties to the relevant instruments on weapons of mass destruction to 
                                                          
105 B Kendall, ‘Syria crisis: No winner in Russia-US G20 duel’, BBC News (7 September 2013), available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23999009 (accessed: 13 February 2015). For the text of the statement, 
see ‘Joint Statement on Syria’ (6 September 2013), available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/09/06/joint-statement-syria (accessed: 13 February 2015). 
106  ‘Arab League urges UN-backed action in Syria’, Al Jazeera (2 September 2013), available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/09/20139118235327617.html (accessed: 13 February 2015). 
107 UNGA First Committee, 68th Session, 3rd Meeting (7 October 2013) at 5-8. 
108 ‘16ème Sommet des Chefs d’État ou de Gouvernement du Mouvement des Pays Non-Alignés, Document 
Final, Téhéran, République Islamique d’Iran’ at para 31.5 (31 Août 2012). See also paras 24.2, 24.3, 24.6, 25.4, 
27.8, 28.2, 29, 31.5.  
109 5th Meeting (24 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.5 at 10 (Brazil), 24 (Chile), 50 (South Africa), 55 (Sri 
Lanka); 6th Meeting (24 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.6 at 5 (Austria), 15 (Iran); 7 th Meeting (24 
September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.7 at 2 (Switzerland), 11 (Argentina), 21 (Sweden), 40 (Italy); 9th Meeting 
(25 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.9 at 13 (Poland), 16 (Swaziland); 10 th Meeting (25 September 2013), 
UN Doc. A/68/PV.10 at 12-13 (Bolivia), 21-22 (Trinidad and Tobago); 16th Meeting (27 September 2013), UN 
Doc. A/68/PV.16 at 7 (Saint Vincent and the Grenadines); 17th Meeting (27 September 2013), UN Doc. 
A/68/PV.17 at 5 (Sudan), 18 (Venezuela), 18th Meeting (28 September 2013), 7 (Mauritius), 8 (Vanuatu), 16 
(Malaysia), 45 (Kyrgyzstan), 19th Meeting (28 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.19 at 8 (Ireland), 28 
(Yemen); 21st Meeting (30 September 2013), UN Doc. A/68/PV.21 at 9 (Syria); 23rd Meeting (1 October 2013), 
UN Doc. A/68/PV.23 at 5 (Botswana), 9 (Holy See), 19 (Dominica), 25 (Ecuador).  
110  See the statements of Chile, Costa Rica, Estonia, Panama, Poland, Libya, Australia, the Netherlands, 
Montenegro, the Czech Republic, Finland, Iceland, Botswana, the Holy See and Denmark.  
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consult and cooperate among themselves in resolving their concerns with regard to cases of 
non-compliance as well as on implementation, in accordance with the procedures defined in 
those instruments, and to refrain from resorting or threatening to resort to unilateral actions, 
or directing unverified non-compliance accusations against one another to resolve their 
concerns’.111 The General Assembly also adopted Resolution 68/184 (2013) by a vote of 86-
36-61 in which it, inter alia: ‘Reminds the Security Council of its primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security’.112  
The reactions in the international community reveal that the UK stood nigh-alone in 
endorsing the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention. First, neither France nor the USA 
invoked the doctrine. Secondly, neither allied States (save Denmark), NATO nor the EU 
publicly endorsed the British legal position. Thirdly, many States explicitly opposed it and 
others (e.g. – in the Arab League and the NAM) implicitly did so by supporting the 
traditional view that the use of force is lawful only in self-defence or with a UN mandate. 
This is reflected in the emphasis placed upon collective security and peaceful dispute 
settlement in the Charter and in UNGA resolutions. 
 
III. THE LEGAL ROLE OF CONSULTATIVE PARLIAMENTARY VOTES 
Even if, contrary to the arguments considered in Section I, it is legally possible to ‘amend’ 
the UN Charter through customary international law to add a third exception to the 
prohibition on the use of force, the distinct lack of support in the international community of 
States for humanitarian intervention in the Syria episode outlined in Section II supports the 
conclusion that it has not attained the status of custom. In this context, this section considers 
the legal role of consultative parliamentary votes in two respects: 1) as a procedural safeguard 
                                                          
111 UNGA Resn 68/38 (‘Promotion of multilateralism in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation’, Dec. 
10, 2013) at OP6.  
112 UNGA Resn 68/182 (‘Situation of human rights in the Syrian Arab Republic’)(18 December 2013) at OP 4, 
12.  
 23 
 
at the domestic level against the commission of the internationally wrongful act of 
aggression; and 2) irrespective of the first, as an expression of the State’s legal position.  
The nexus for this interaction between constitutional law and public international 
law113 is the putative entry into force on 1 January 2017 of the jurisdiction of the ICC over 
the international crime of aggression.114 In comparing the constitutional positions of the P3, 
consultative parliamentary votes can play an essential role in protecting the national interest 
and the international rule of law as an independent check upon the executive to avert the 
commission of aggression. However, the ability of national parliaments to perform this 
function depends upon, in particular, access to independent legal advice and statutory 
entrenchment of consultation that is protected by judicial recourse.  
 
A. Consultative Votes in the UK 
Inquiries in the past year by Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Constitutional and Political 
Reform Committee and Defence Select Committee investigating the Syria episode have 
questioned the modalities of parliamentary consultation and the lawfulness of humanitarian 
intervention following the international reaction to the Syria operation. 115  Parliamentary 
consultation is arguably an issue of the greatest importance for the UK of the P3, not only due 
to its parliamentary system of government and to the continuing political legacy of the 
                                                          
113 Constitutional law has a profound practical role in the work of governmental legal advisers – M Wood, 
International Law and the Use of Force: What Happens in Practice?, unpublished paper, cited with permission. 
114ICC Assembly of States Parties Resolution RC/Res.6 (‘The Crime of Aggression’)(11 June 2010), available 
at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf (accessed: 13 February 2015). The 
amendments activating the Court’s jurisdiction over aggression will enter into force upon ratification by 30 State 
Parties and a final decision of the Assembly of State Parties. As of 7 February 2015, 22 States Parties have 
ratified – available at: https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10-
b&chapter=18&lang=en (accessed: 13 February 2015). 
115 HC Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Parliament’s role in conflict decisions: a way forward, 
(HC 2013-14, 892); House of Commons Defence Committee, Intervention: Why, When and How? (HC 2013-
14, 952). 
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controversial Iraq War116 but also to the fact that the UK and France, unlike the USA, are 
parties to the ICC Statute while the UK is also the only one of the three to be party to the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.117 This leaves the UK more exposed to the possibility of 
an inter-state action at the ICJ and/or prosecution of its officials at the ICC for aggression.  
The consultative parliamentary vote consequently assumes greater importance as a 
constitutional safeguard against the commission of aggression, amplified by the present 
inability of domestic courts to adjudicate alleged crimes of aggression. 118  Should the UK 
become party to the jurisdiction of the ICC over the international crime of aggression and 
decline to amend section 50 of the International Criminal Court Act 2001 (c.17) to empower 
domestic courts to adjudicate it, complementarity 119  would render accusations of the 
commission of the crime of aggression admissible ipso iure before the ICC. This would run 
counter to Government policy to ensure the efficacy of domestic criminal procedures and 
thereby avoid British nationals from prosecution at the ICC for international crimes.120 As the 
UK has yet to ratify the ICC Statute amendments on aggression, an open legal question is 
whether a State Party that has not ‘opted out’ of the Court’s jurisdiction over aggression under 
Article 15bis(4) and has not ratified the amendments will be bound by it;121 unless States 
Parties come to a consensus on this point, it is likely that it will have to be resolved by ICC 
                                                          
116 For background, see, e.g. – M Weller, Iraq and the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2010), 
pp 189-232.  
117 The declaration of the United Kingdom accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court is available online 
at: http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=GB (accessed: 13 February 2015). 
118 R v Jones (Margaret) and others [2007] 1 A.C. 136 at 162 (para 30, per Lord Bingham of Cornhill). See 
further R Joseph, The War Prerogative (Oxford: OUP, 2013) at 110-156. 
119 Statute of the ICC 1998, Art 17: ‘Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall 
determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which 
has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or 
prosecution’. 
120  See, e.g. – ‘Statement by Baroness Anelay, Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, General Debate’ (11 December 2014), p 3, available at: http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP13/GenDeba/ICC-ASP13-GenDeba-UK-ENG.PDF (accessed: 13 February 2015). 
121 See further, e.g. – C Kreß and L von Holtzendorff, ‘The Kampala Compromise on the Crime of Aggression’ 
(2010) 8 JICJ 1179 at 1195-1199; N Blokker, ‘A consensus agreement on the crime of aggression: impressions 
from Kampala’ (2010) 23(4) LJIL 889 at 893-894.  
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judges in the Pre-Trial Chamber.122 Although the UK could exercise an ‘opt out’ through a 
declaration, it stated in 2012: 
‘We now have a period to reflect on this issue before any amendment enters in to force, following 
further discussion by the ASP in 2017. In this regard, we note that all the amendments were adopted 
under Article 121 paragraph 5 of the Rome Statute and accordingly they will only enter into force for a 
State Party once it has ratified that amendment. It is not, therefore, necessary for a State that has not 
ratified the amendment on the crime of aggression, and which does not wish to be bound by it, to make 
a declaration under article 15 bis paragraph 4.’ 123 
This runs counter to the logic of an ‘opt out’ provision, which requires a declaration; rather, it 
is an ‘opt in’ or ‘strictly reciprocal state-consent-based jurisdictional regime’ – an approach 
rejected at Kampala.124 It is also reflects discomfort with the invidious position of opting out 
of the jurisdiction of a court that the UK vigorously promotes.  
  Furthermore, the consultative vote can also play an important role in defining the 
legal position of the UK (its opinio iuris) concerning the lawfulness of a use of force. As the 
royal prerogative on the use of force remains intact,125 it was open to British Government to 
proceed with their own view concerning the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention. 
However, the prerogative is qualified by a convention that the Commons ‘should have the 
opportunity to debate and express its view through a vote, except where there was an 
emergency and such action would not be appropriate’. 126  Absent such a check, it is 
constitutionally possible (albeit politically far-fetched) for the monarch – who enjoys no 
immunity before the ICC127 – to retain independent legal advice and thereafter reject the Prime 
Minister’s advice to deploy the armed forces on grounds of illegality. 128  Parliamentarians 
                                                          
122 Kreß and Holtzendorff, above n 121, at 1214-1215. 
123 ‘UK Statement to the 10th Session of the Assembly of States Parties to the ICC’ (9 February 2012), p 2, 
available at: http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP10/Statements/ICC-ASP10-GenDeba-UK-ENG.pdf 
(accessed: 13 February 2015). 
124 Kreß and von Holzendorff, above n 121 at 1203-1207, 1212-1213. 
125 For background and analysis, see Joseph, above n 118, at 44-109.    
126 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Parliament’s role in conflict decisions, 
above n 115, p 11 (para 11). 
127 ICC Statute, Art 27. 
128 The monarch has the ‘right to be consulted, the right to encourage, and the right to warn’ (W Bagehot, The 
English Constitution (1867)), which provides the possibility for a material role on the formulation of policy. 
Although the modern convention has been that the monarch does not exercise the prerogative in a personal 
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voting in favour of aggression may also find themselves at risk of prosecution, alongside 
armed services chiefs, though a defence may be that they lack ‘effective control’ over the 
decision to commit aggression, which is in practice taken by the Cabinet. Both categories of 
persons were prosecuted for aggression at Nuremberg with mixed results.129  
In this context, the modalities for consultative votes continue to be a fraught 
constitutional problem:  
‘Given the absence of legal restraint on the deployment power under domestic law, the rules of 
international law on the use of force take on an enhanced significance as the only apparent limitation 
on the prerogative. Domestic legality does not pre-empt international law. In other words action, which 
may not be unlawful under domestic law, could be in violation of international law.’130 
 
Options under consideration for the clarification of Parliament’s role in the use of force 
include the transfer of the royal prerogative to Parliament, a requirement for formal 
accounting of the exercise of the prerogative to Parliament, scrutiny of the exercise of the 
prerogative by Parliament and the subjection of the prerogative to formal approval by 
Parliament. 131  However, no resolution has yet been reached on the long-term basis for 
Parliament’s involvement in the exercise of the prerogative.132  
Indeed, the Government has seemingly sought to weaken the existing convention: 
‘The Government remains committed to the existing convention that before UK troops are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
capacity since at least the nineteenth century, in practice monarchs have ‘continued to play a material, if hidden, 
part in the direction of foreign affairs’ – Joseph, above n 118 at 59. In addition, former Chief of the Defence 
Staff Lord Guthrie has suggested that the Monarch has a reserve power to countermand the Prime Minister in 
the event of a ‘mad’ decision to deploy nuclear weapons – R Knight, ‘Whose hand is on the button?’ BBC Radio 
4 (2 December 2008), available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7758314.stm (accessed: 13 February 2015). 
The possibility of criminal responsibility for the monarch has never been a factor due to the immunity of the 
Crown from domestic prosecution as a facet of kingship – Halsbury’s Laws of England (London: Lexis 
Butterworths, 2014)(Vol 29) at paras 84-86.  
129  See Article 8bis(a) of the crime of aggression amendments to the ICC Statute, above note 114. For 
background on the crime of aggression with particular reference to the judgment of the International Military 
Tribunal at Nuremberg, see, e.g. – S Sayapin, The Crime of Aggression in the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (Springer: The Hague, 2014), pp 149-160, 222-225, 290-297; K Sellars, ‘Crimes Against Peace’ 
and International Law (CUP: Cambridge, 2013), pp 113-139, 260-287; K.J. Heller, ‘Retreat from Nuremberg: 
The Leadership Requirement in the Crime of Aggression’ (2007) 18(3) EJIL, 477-497.  
130 HL Select Committee on the Constitution, ‘Waging war: Parliament’s role and responsibility’ (HL 236-I, 27 
July 2006), p 15 (para 30). 
131 Ibid, pp 26-43 (paras 60-111).  
132 Ibid, pp 28-30 (paras 68-74); HC Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Parliament’s role in 
conflict decisions, above n 126, pp 18-20 (paras 41-47). 
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committed to conflict, the House of Commons should have the opportunity to debate and 
express its view through a vote, except where there was an emergency or such action would 
not be appropriate.’133 The use of the disjunctive ‘or’ replaces the conjunctive ‘and’ in the 
existing convention, which is potentially significant in providing a future Government with a 
subjective basis to not consult the Commons. Furthermore, the Government has refused to 
commit to publish summaries of its legal position, per the Committee’s recommendation, as 
‘normal and best practice’: ‘The publication of summaries of the Government’s legal 
position…will need to be considered on a case by case basis taking into account the 
confidentiality of the Attorney General’s full legal advice.’134  
It is suggested that the present convention that Parliament be consulted prior to the 
exercise of the prerogative (excluding emergency situations) should be enshrined in statute 
with the possibility of judicial review in the event of the Government failing to respect it.135 
Although there are detailed problems to be solved in enacting such a reform,136 particularly in 
relation to judicial review, there is a real need for a constitutional safeguard to deter future 
governments from committing aggression by providing for parliamentary scrutiny on ‘wars of 
choice’. In light of the anticipated entry into force of the ICC jurisdiction over aggression, this 
would improve security for ministers, generals, parliamentarians and even the Sovereign.   
                                                          
133 Ibid, p 6 (para 11)(emphasis added).  
134 HC Defence Committee, Intervention: Government Response, above n 45, p 5 (para 10).  
135 HC Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Parliament’s role in conflict decisions, above n 126, pp 
15, 21-22 (paras 29, 48, 50). The Committee’s proposals call for enshrining Parliament’s consultative role 
through a resolution rather than an Act, specifically to avoid the prospect of judicial review. See also the 
proposal for a statutory underpinning with a limited ‘backstop’ role for the courts in Joseph, above n 118, at 
181-216.  
136 Joseph proposes that ‘the enactment of a statute which would require the government to obtain in the House 
of Commons a majority vote in support of deployment of the armed forces, except in identified situations; 
impose duties on the government to provide Parliament (and the public) with certain information about the 
proposed deployment; and establish a special joint committee of Parliament to scrutinize the relevant 
information and exercise a general oversight role over the deployment of forces’ – above n 118, at 181. One 
reviewer, while approving this specific proposal, does not feel that it fully considers the problem of ‘inadequate 
government accountability before Parliament’ in the British constitution as a whole – D Jenkins, ‘Publication 
Review: Joseph, The War Prerogative’ (Jan 2015) PL 188-191, at 191. 
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However, even if Parliament’s role were to be ensured, access to legal advice is 
critical to ensure that Parliament’s involvement is informed and effective as a check upon 
unlawful action.137 In this respect, the Note published by the Office of the Prime Minister 
(‘the Note’) on 29 August 2013 138  exemplifying the current practice of publishing 
‘summaries of legal advice’ is inadequate.139 In proposing his motion to the House, the Prime 
Minister asserted: ‘We have a summary of the Government’s legal position, which makes it 
explicit that military action would have a clear legal basis [of humanitarian intervention].’140  
However, the Note does not constitute ‘legal advice’ in the true sense of the term, 
namely, as an independent opinion produced by a qualified lawyer who accepts professional 
responsibility for its contents.141  It was neither signed by the Attorney nor attributed to 
him.142 It is consequently best-treated as either the collective view of the Cabinet143 (though 
there is no record of its having been discussed or voted upon in Cabinet) or as the personal 
view of the Prime Minister. Although it is not clear to what degree the Note is based upon 
confidential legal advice provided by the Attorney, its value as a definitive statement of the 
legal position of the UK is diminished by the fact that the Attorney (unlike in the case of Lord 
                                                          
137 For background on the legacy of the Iraq legal advice, see Joseph, above n 118, at 208-209.   
138‘Chemical weapon use by Syrian regime: UK government legal position’ (‘UK Government Legal Position’), 
available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/chemical-weapon-use-by-syrian-regime-uk-
government-legal-position (accessed: 13 February 2015).  
139 Ms Caroline Lucas MP, Mr Edward Miliband MP and Mr James Arbuthnot MP referred to the ‘summary of 
legal advice’ in the debate to criticise its lack of detail – HC Deb (29 August 2013) at cols 1426, 1443, 1463. 
However, Dr Liam Fox MP, Sir Menzies Campbell MP and Mr Andrew Mitchell MP did refer to it for the 
purpose of substantiation – ibid at cols 1454, 1456, 1462. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Although the Attorney General has a ministerial role, in the provision of legal advice he has been likened, in 
the words of former Attorney General Lord Morris of Aberavon, as ‘a family solicitor, with the Government as 
his client’ - HL Select Committee on the Constitution, ‘Waging war: Parliament’s role and responsibility’, 
above n 130, p 29 (para 71). Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales (9th edition, January 2014), 
rC15. Although Sir John Hobson was tried by his Inn of Court for professional misconduct in 1963, the Bar 
Standards Board found in 2003 that it lacked jurisdiction to hear a complaint of misconduct against Lord 
Goldsmith regarding the impartiality of his legal advice concerning the Iraq War – see Sarvarian, Professional 
Ethics at the International Bar (Oxford: OUP, 2013) at 39-40 (n 95). 
142 The Prime Minister did, however, inaccurately describe the document as ‘the Attorney-General’s excellent 
legal advice to the House’ in the course of debate – HC Deb (29 August 2013) at col 1430. 
143 The Cabinet is a committee of HM’s Privy Council, composed of Ministers of the Crown and the collective 
decision-making body of the Government. Constitutionally, the Cabinet advises the monarch on the exercise of 
her Prerogative on the use of force.  
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Goldsmith concerning Iraq and in that of Mr Grieve regarding Libya) did not assume political 
responsibility for it through a ministerial statement. 144  In light of the inadequacy of 
summaries of ‘advice’ and the lack of support for the idea that legal advice of Attorneys 
General be provided to Parliament, the pragmatic option would be the commissioning by 
Parliament of its own legal advice – for example, through a joint select committee.145 
 Notwithstanding the conclusions in Section II above, the Government has 
demonstrated a firm commitment to continue existing policy in support of humanitarian 
intervention in spite of the negative international reaction and the doubts of Parliament. The 
Defence Select Committee concluded:  
‘The legal justification for military intervention will continue to be controversial. We note the 
Government’s statement that when there is no UN Security Council Resolution for action, there is a 
legal basis available under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention which would permit the UK under 
international law to take exceptional measures in order to alleviate a humanitarian catastrophe 
providing certain conditions are met. We question whether the Government’s position is generally 
accepted by the international community or the British public. The Government should set out in detail 
in the next iterations of the National Security Strategy and the Defence and Security Review the 
principles of its legal position, including its relationship with the UN Charter, international law and the 
concept of the Responsibility to Protect, on the deployment of UK Armed Forces for intervention 
operations. This would assist with providing the public with greater information on, and understanding 
of, the Government’s position on the use of UK Armed Forces rather than waiting to the heat of debate 
immediately prior to a potential deployment.’146 
 
The Government replied to the Committee’s conclusion by referencing the evidence of the 
Right Hon Hugh Robertson MP’s letter to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee:  
‘Nothing has changed with regard to the basis for the Government’s position, which predates 2000.  
[…] The 2005 World Summit Outcome document is in the form of a non-binding United Nations 
General Assembly resolution, albeit one that was agreed by consensus and adopted at a high-level 
political event. It simply indicates a responsibility based on existing legal norms, while going on to 
express a political readiness to take collective action. The Summit’s adoption of the “Responsibility to 
                                                          
144 The first question posed to the Prime Minister in the House of Commons debate was ‘why [the Prime 
Minister] has refused to publish the Attorney-General's full advice’ – HC Deb (29 August 2013) at col 1426. 
The Prime Minister replied: ‘There had been a long-standing convention, backed by Attorney-Generals of all 
parties and all Governments, not to publish any legal advice at all. This Government changed that. With the 
Libya conflict, we published a summary of the legal advice. On this issue, we have published a very clear 
summary of the legal advice and I urge all right hon. and hon. Members to read it.’ A ministerial statement 
carries with it the possibility of ministerial accountability, including the theoretical (though arguably obsolete) 
possibility of impeachment, last attempted in 2004 against the former Prime Minister, Tony Blair, over the Iraq 
War – O Gay and N Davies, ‘Impeachment’, House of Commons Library, SN/PC/02666 (16 November 2011) at 
4. 
145 HL Select Committee on the Constitution, ‘Waging war: Parliament’s role and responsibility’, above n 130, p 
20 (para 47). 
146 Ibid, p 29 (para. 49). 
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Protect” was politically significant, and one that the Government welcomed and has continued to 
promote. But the “Responsibility to Protect” as set out in the Outcome Document does not in itself 
create new legal rights and duties or modify existing ones. And it does not address the question of 
unilateral State action in the face of an overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe to which the Security 
Council has not responded. Rather, the “Responsibility to Protect” is aimed at making sure that the 
Security Council does take action.’147  
 
Mr Robertson further asserted that humanitarian intervention ‘does not have adverse 
implications for the UN’ and is not connected to the responsibility to protect doctrine.148 This 
is reminiscent of the Government’s response in 2004 to similar parliamentary inquiries on the 
Kosovo operation.’149  
 The Chairman of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee 
observed that the UK is ‘almost alone among UN Member States’ in opining that humanitarian 
intervention is lawful.150Although there is no sign that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
and Ministry of Defence are contemplating a policy change,  pressure from Parliament coupled 
with lack of support in the international community may prompt a review in the next National 
Security Strategy in 2015.151 The Strategy should explicitly revert to the pre-1992 policy by 
rejecting humanitarian intervention as a legal basis for the use of force. In addition, it should 
set out a detailed legal framework for the use of force based on the following, orthodox 
grounds: 1) authorisation by the UNSC; 2) in the event of a veto, authorisation by the UNGA 
under the Uniting for Peace procedure; 3) individual self-defence; or 4) collective self-defence.  
 
B. Consultative Votes in the USA 
                                                          
147 Ibid.  
148 Ibid. 
149 ‘Letter from the Parliamentary Relations and Devolution Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(July 5, 2004)’ in Wood, above n Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
150 HC Defence Committee, Intervention (Vol. II), above n Error! Bookmark not defined., p 61 (Ev w58).  
151 In Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (Cm 7948, Oct. 
2010), para 2.10 states the United Kingdom Armed Forces are deployed ‘only…where justifiable under 
international law’. In A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy (Cm 7593, Oct. 
2010) para 3.32 asserts: ‘Our strategic interests and responsibilities overseas could in some circumstances justify 
the threat or use of military force. There will also be occasions when it is in our interests to take part in 
humanitarian interventions.’  
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In the USA, the position is defined by the War Powers Clause in its constitution.152 The War 
Powers Resolution 1973153 requires the President to, inter alia, consult the Congress ‘in every 
possible instance…before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities’. Whilst 
the Resolution has been controversial, the Obama Administration has acknowledged ‘that 
Congress has powers to regulate and terminate uses of force, and that the War Powers 
Resolution plays an important role in promoting inter-branch dialogue and deliberation on 
these critical matters.’154 An open constitutional question is whether the President has the 
power to proceed despite a negative vote by the Congress to authorise the use of force.155      
In this ambiguous context, there was the clear potential for the President and the 
Congress to adopt conflicting positions on the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention. 
Nevertheless, the War Powers Resolution was an ineffective tool in the Syria crisis for the 
scrutiny of the legal case for the use of force. This is due to three factors: 1) the absence of 
reference to the doctrine in the Joint Resolution; 2) the fact that the Administration declined 
to put forward any international law justification for the proposed use of force, including 
humanitarian intervention; and 3) the almost complete absence of legality as an issue in the 
congressional debates on the Joint Resolution. Unlike in the UK, the ineffectiveness of the 
Congress as a brake upon aggression is due not to a weak constitutional position but to its 
own disinterest in the question of legality itself.  
  
C. Consultative Votes in France 
                                                          
152  Constitution of the United States of America, available at:  
http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm (accessed: 13 February 2015), Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 11: ‘[The Congress shall have Power…] to Declare War, grant Letters of Marque and 
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water’.  
153 50 U.S.C. 1541–1548.  
154 H Koh, ‘Syria and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention (Part I: Political Miscues and U.S. Law)’, EJIL 
Talk! Blog (26 September 2013), available online: http://www.ejiltalk.org/syria-and-the-law-of-humanitarian-
intervention-part-i-political-miscues-and-u-s-law/ (accessed: 13 February 2015). 
155 Ibid. 
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In France, the President is vested with exclusive authority over the conduct of foreign and 
military affairs.156 This was conceived by Charles de Gaulle to strengthen the Presidency at 
the expense of the legislature, which had had a stronger role during the Fourth Republic. By 
Article 35 of the constitution, the Government is required to inform Parliament of a decision 
to have the armed forces intervene abroad three days after the beginning of the intervention 
and detailing its objectives; although Parliament may debate the intervention, such debate 
may not be followed by a vote.  However, such intervention is subject to a time limit of four 
months, following which parliamentary authorisation is required for extension.  
Unlike the quite explicit nature of the motion in the House of Commons espousing the 
principle of humanitarian intervention, there was no occasion for the National Assembly to 
express its view on the legality of the doctrine. Consequently, the legal position was defined 
exclusively by the Government which, aside from a stray reference to the responsibility to 
protect, the Government refrained from advancing a legal justification at the UN or 
elsewhere. The inability of the National Assembly to act as a check upon the President is due 
to its constitutional weakness in military affairs, precluding even a consultative vote. 
 
D. Post-Syria Developments: The Rise of Islamic State 
In the aftermath of the abortive operation in Syria, the rapid military and territorial successes 
scored throughout 2014 by the armed group formerly known as the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and 
the Levant’, referring to itself since 29 June 2014 as ‘Islamic State’ following its declaration 
of a new caliphate, sparked fears of the imminent fall of Baghdad and collapse of Iraqi 
governmental authority. From 8 August, the US government spearheaded military operations 
by NATO allies (principally the UK, Belgium, Canada, Australia and France), principally 
                                                          
156 Constitution of 4 October 1958, available online: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/ (accessed: 13 
February 2015), Arts 5, 8, 14, 15, 20, 21.  
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comprising aerial bombardments, against Islamic State in Iraqi territory. On 10 September 
2014, the USA expanded its operations to Syrian territory. As of the time of writing, military 
operations are ongoing. 
 The USA has hitherto omitted to put forward a legal justification for its operations 
and the Obama Administration has confirmed that congressional approval for the operations 
will not be sought.157 Although congressional approval for the Administration’s plan to arm 
and train Syrian rebels was given on 19 September 2014, US constitutional lawyers remain 
doubtful of the compatibility of long-term military operations with the War Powers 
Resolution.158 The USA has not invoked self-defence at the UN and it has not obtained the 
consent of the al-Assad government of Syria for its airstrikes in Syria – though it has kept it 
informed of its operations on Syrian territory.159  
 By contrast and in spite of its defeat in the House of Commons the previous year, the 
British Government opted to follow the same gambit for political backing through a 
parliamentary motion.160 The motion explicitly did not ‘endorse UK air strikes in Syria as 
part of this campaign and any proposal to do so would be subject to a separate vote in 
Parliament’.161 As with Syria and Libya, the Prime Minister published a ‘summary of legal 
advice’162 asserting that ‘[t]he government is satisfied that the consent of Iraq in these terms 
provides a clear and unequivocal legal basis for the deployment of UK forces and military 
assets to take military action to strike ISIL sites and military strongholds in Iraq.’ Although 
                                                          
157 Henderson, above n 9, at 211.  
158 E.g. – S Bomboy, ‘Experts ponder Obama’s War Powers curveball’ Constitution Daily Blog (12 September 
2014), available at: http://blog.constitutioncenter.org/2014/09/experts-ponder-obamas-war-powers-curveball/ 
(accessed: 13 February 2015).  
159 Henderson, above n 9, at 217-218. 
160 HC Deb, col 1255 (26 Sept 2014). 
161 Ibid. 
162 ‘Summary of the government legal position on military action in Iraq against ISIL’ (25 September 2014), 
available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/military-action-in-iraq-against-isil-government-legal-
position/summary-of-the-government-legal-position-on-military-action-in-iraq-against-isil (accessed: 13 
February 2015).  
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the Prime Minister suggested in debate that there were ‘a variety of legal arguments that 
[could] be deployed’, he based the action exclusively on consent: 
‘The Attorney-General has given his advice on the action we propose to take. There is a clear legal 
base for UK military action to help Iraq defend itself from ISIL…there is no question but that we have 
the legal basis for action, founded on the request of the Iraqi Government.’163 
 
Following debate, in which legality was central,164 the motion was carried by 524 votes to 43.  
 As of the time of writing, the Obama Administration had submitted a written request 
to the Congress to approve the use of force against Islamic State under the War Powers 
Resolution.165  Whilst the resolution states that ‘the United States has taken military action 
against ISIL in accordance with its inherent right of individual and collective self-defense’, 
the Administration has yet to publish an international law justification. Resolutions and 
debates in the parliaments of Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands appeared to base their 
justifications upon the consent of the Iraqi government.166  
 Thus, the ongoing operations against Islamic State are not directly relevant to the 
question of the legal status of humanitarian intervention as neither the USA nor the UK has 
invoked the doctrine.167 Nonetheless, the differing approaches of the two government towards 
consultative parliamentary votes may be attributable to a number of factors, such as:  
1) the legacy of the illegality of the 2003 Iraq war continues to be acute in Britain, 
yet is a weaker factor in US domestic politics; 
2) international law has played a greater role in political debate in Britain concerning 
the use of force since at least Kosovo, yet is largely invisible in US domestic 
politics; 
                                                          
163 HC Deb (26 September 2014), Col 1263. See further the House of Commons Defence Select Committee 
Seventh Report, The situation in Iraq and Syria and the response to al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq al-Sham 
(DAESH), (27 January 2015) at paras 20-23. 
164 HC Deb, cols 1256, 1259, 1263-1264, 1270-1271, 1274, 1279, 1283, 1288, 1290-1293.  
165 T Rupar, ‘Obama’s request for congressional authorization to fight the Islamic State: Full text’ The 
Washington Post (11 February 2015), available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
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3) in a parliamentary system of government, it is theoretically easier than in a 
presidential system for the legislature to pressure the executive concerning the use 
of force (e.g. – the fall of Lord Aberdeen’s Ministry through a vote of no 
confidence in 1855 due to the conduct of the Crimean War), particularly when the 
government majority is small; 
4) there is greater war fatigue in Britain than in the USA, reflected by the greater 
scepticism of parliamentarians for the use of force in new crises.  
Notwithstanding the Cameron Ministry’s continuing resistance to a permanent commitment 
to parliamentary consultation, as advocated by the select committees and the fact that the 
parliamentary motion was passed, the parliamentary consultative vote played a crucial role in 
restricting the use of force to the territory of Iraq. As the legality of that operation is far 
stronger than the Obama Administration’s operation in Syria, this demonstrates the potential 
utility of the consultative vote as a check upon illegal wars.  
   
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
This article has examined the lawfulness of the aborted use of force against Syria in August-
September 2013 in response to the use of chemical weapons in Damascus. In Section I, it has 
argued that humanitarian intervention, as a matter of law, must be enacted through 
amendment to the UN Charter rather than customary international law due to the hierarchy of 
norms. Moreover, even if humanitarian intervention can be adopted through custom, the 
detailed survey of the opiniones iura of States regarding the abortive Syrian operation in 
Section II underscores the lack of international support for the doctrine. As set out in Section 
III, consultative parliamentary votes have the potential to act as a constitutional safeguard 
against the commission of aggression but their efficacy depends upon a statutory 
underpinning and independent legal advice in order to enable national parliaments to properly 
debate the legality of a proposed ‘war of choice’. 
The decision of the USA and France to refrain from advancing legal justifications for 
the proposed operation, coupled with the lack of support from NATO and EU allies, 
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undercuts the continuing British commitment to humanitarian intervention. Numerous and 
explicit rejections of the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention by the BRICS and other 
States in the UN and elsewhere have reaffirmed their longstanding position that the use of 
force is lawful only with UN authorisation or in self-defence. If humanitarian intervention 
was legally infirm after the Kosovo episode, the Syria case has placed it on its deathbed. 
Although the International Law Association Committee on the Use of Force has yet to adopt 
a position on the lawfulness of humanitarian intervention in its pending project on aggression 
and the use of force,168 early scholarly reaction to the Syria operation supports the argument 
that humanitarian intervention does not have sufficient State support to become a legal basis 
for the use of force.169 
The British Government has remained firm in its commitment to the legality of 
humanitarian intervention; it stands virtually alone in the international community. The 
rejection of its motion on Syria, coupled with doubts expressed by parliamentary committees 
in subsequent inquiries, illustrates the rising tide of parliamentary disquiet over the doctrine. 
This article calls upon the Government to revert to its pre-1992 policy in the forthcoming 
National Security Strategy 2015. This should be done by setting out a detailed legal 
framework for the use of force based upon the widely-accepted legal bases of collective 
security authorisation – on which the responsibility to protect is based – and self-defence.  
This does not mean that collective security in response to a grave humanitarian crisis 
can be utterly frustrated through veto or threat of veto at the Security Council. The possibility 
remains (with the caveats noted above) of calling an emergency special session of the 
General Assembly through the Uniting for Peace procedure to seek authorisation for forcible 
                                                          
168 International Law Association Washington Conference (2014) Use of Force Committee, ‘Draft Report on 
Aggression and the Use of Force’ (14 March 2014), section C.1, available at: http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1036 (13 February 2015). The author is a member of the Committee but the 
views contained in this article are entirely his own and do not reflect those of the Committee.  
169 Henriksen and Schack, above n 5, at 147; Stahn, above n 5, at 35, 45-46. 
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measures.170 It is noteworthy that, whereas forcible measures under Article 42 have been 
deployed by the Security Council on two occasions, the Uniting for Peace procedure has been 
utilised on ten occasions and has gained widespread acceptance as a lawful alternative 
mechanism. Whilst the motivations for the reluctance of NATO members to resort to the 
Uniting for Peace procedure in the post-decolonisation era are speculative, it is plausible that 
the causa causans is a desire to concentrate power in the Security Council in which the veto 
power is available.171  
 Consultative votes by national parliaments have the potential172 to serve as a useful 
constitutional safeguard against the commission of aggression by the State through detailed, 
rigorous, public scrutiny of the government’s legal position. Such votes should be viewed not 
only as a means to drum up political support for the use of force but also as a crucial check 
for legality amidst the drums of war. A statutory underpinning, backed by judicial review, 
and the provision of independent legal advice – in light of the confidentiality of the Attorney 
General’s advice – are key. The recalcitrance of the British Government risks the exposure 
not only of the UK to suit at the ICJ but also of ministers, generals, parliamentarians and even 
the monarch to prosecution at the ICC from 2017.  The effectiveness of international law on 
the use of force depends not only on international mechanisms for its retrospective 
enforcement but also upon national safeguards against prospective wrongdoing.   
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